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Experimental Evidence
Donald L. Guarnieri*
T HE PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE is to explain the concepts basic
to the admissibility of experimental evidence in civil jury
cases. The article will examine the prerequisites to the admissi-
bility of experimental evidence, will give illustrations of various
experiments, and will comment on the trend of court decisions
since the latter part of the nineteenth century. The article deals
primarily with experiments conducted outside of the court room
as opposed to experiments conducted in the courtroom in the
presence of a jury.
Academically, the history of the introduction of experi-
mental evidence conducted outside the courtroom in civil jury
cases dates from the decision in Washington A. & G. Steam
Packet Co. v. Sickles, decided in the year 1850.1 The plaintiff,
in an action in quantum meruit for the use of a machine placed
in defendant's boat for the purpose of saving fuel, introduced
evidence of experiments in the use of the machine, made by
practical engineers, as tending to prove the amount of fuel saved.
Since the decision in the Washington Steam Packet case, the
courts have found it necessary to pass on admissibility of various
experiments in civil cases in ever-increasing numbers. The rail-
roads at the close of the nineteenth century contributed the ma-
jority of these cases. Not until the latter part of the first quarter
of the twentieth century did the automobile contribute to this
number of outstanding cases.
There was resistance exhibited in some earlier cases to the
admissibility of experiments, but it is now generally held that
experiments may be performed in the presence of the jury, or
evidence of experiments performed out of the court may be ad-
mitted in the discretion of the trial judge.2
The growing use of scientific evidence (the testing of the
truth by hypotheses with the use of controlled experiments) has
become one of the most important techniques in modern trial
practice. Personal injury lawyers as well as lawyers for the de-
*A.B., Hiram College; LL.B., Cleveland-Marshall Law School; member of
the Ohio Bar; Associate in the firm of Guarnieri and Secrest of Warren,
Ohio; graduate student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1 10 How. 419; 13 L. Ed. 479 (1850).
2 21 Ohio Jur. 2d., Evidence, Sec. 521, at 544.
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fense make extensive use of this technique. The task of a law-
yer is to recognize and understand the opportunities for the use
of such evidence and to employ them inventively. The results
that are derived from the introduction of experiments through
the conduct of the experiment in the courtroom, or through the
testimony of the expert who conducted the experiment outside
of the courtroom, will be convincing to both judge and jury.
There is an unlimited source of factual situations which
present opportunities for the introduction of experimental evi-
dence. Some of the types of experiments most frequently in-
troduced, and which will be discussed later in this work in-
clude: tests of the visibility of objects or persons at a given
distance; tests of speeds of locomotives and motor vehicles, and
tests of the effectiveness of their brakes and headlights.
Prerequisites to the Admissibility of Experimental Evidence
Conducted Outside the Courtroom.
Legal doctrine on the introduction of out-of-court experi-
ments is not difficult and should be understood by all practi-
tioners as well as by the judiciary.
The chief concept concerning the admissibility of experi-
mental evidence is the rule of "substantial similarity." Under the
rule of "substantial similarity," evidence of the results of an
analysis or experiments made prior or subsequent to the fact at
issue, where conditions are substantially similar, is admitted into
evidence. If there is no similarity of conditions such evidence
is inadmissible, but if there are some conditions of similarity,
the weight of evidence is in proportion to the evidence's simi-
larity. Greater weight is to be given where there is greater
similarity. Hence, where there are valid points of similarity, such
evidence is admissible, but its weight is for the jury.4
The probative value of experiments will depend upon the
correspondence of conditions under which they are performed to
those of the occurrence being investigated. 5 If there be exact
correspondence of such conditions the experiment will amount
to a demonstration and be conclusive on the issue. Dissimilarity
3 McCormick, Evidence, Sec. 169, at 359 (1954).
4 Beaver Bros. Co. v. Atlas Insurance Co., 131 Fed. 2d. 770 (C. C. A. Ind.,
1943); Briggs v. United Fruit & Produce, 11 Wash. 2d 446, 119 P. 2d 687
(1942).
5 City of Fort Worth v. Lee, 143 Tex., 551, 186 S. W. 2d 954 (1945); Odell v.
Frueh, 146 Cal. App. 2d 504, 304 P. 2d 45 (1957).
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of conditions and experiments may affect not merely the weight
of the evidence but its admissibility.6
If the requirement of similarity is not satisfied, the experi-
mental evidence will be excluded, within the discretion of the
trial judge. The measure of the permissible variation of the con-
ditions surrounding the experiment from those of the occurrence
in question is measured by whether such variation is liable to
confuse the jury or be prejudicial to either the plaintiff or the
defendant.7
Counsel, in planning the experiments, must attempt to re-
produce conditions as nearly as possible identical to the fact
situation presented in the case. In presenting his evidence he
must prepare to lay the foundation by preliminary proof of
similarity of conditions.
In Tuite v. Union Pacific Stages, Inc.,8 Justice Tooze stated,
"Indeed, it is often that such experiments may afford evidence
more satisfactory and reliable than oral testimony. Yet, before
the results of any such experiment may be introduced in evi-
dence, it is necessary to prove that the experiment was made
under conditions and circumstances similar to those prevailing
at the time and place of the occurrence involved in the con-
troversy. It is not necessary that the conditions and circum-
stances under which the experiment was made shall be identical
with those existing at the time and place of the occurrence in
controversy, but it is necessary that there be a substantial
similarity . . Evidence of experiments should always be re-
ceived with caution, and only when it is clear that the jury will
be enlightened thereby." "
Experiments concerning irrelevant or immaterial points in
issue in the trial of the lawsuit should be excluded and not al-
lowed to confuse the jury in its deliberation.' 0
6 21 Ohio Jur. 2d., Evidence, Sec. 522, at 545.
7 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, Sec. 756.
8 284 P. 2d 333 (Ore., 1955); Birmingham Electric Co. v. Woodward, 33 Ala.
App. 526, 35 S. 2d 869 (1948); Glowacki v. A. J. Bayles, 76 Ariz. 259, 263
P. 2d 799 (1953); Beresford v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 45 Cal. 2d 738,
290 P. 2d 498 (1955); Cashman v. Terminal Taxi Co., 131 Conn. 31, 37 A. 2d
613 (1944); Sinclair Oil and Gas Co. v. Albright, 161 Okla. 272, 18 P. 2d
540 (1934); Washington v. City of Seattle, 170 Wash. 371, 16 P. 2d 597(1933); Tassin v. New Orleans Public Service, 19 La. App. 456, 139 S. 695
(1932).
9 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Donaldson, 26 Ala. App. 179, 156 S.
859, cert. den., 229 Ala. 276, 156 S. 865 (1934).
10 McCormack, op. cit. supra, n. 3; Ragan v. MacGill, 134 Ore. 408, 292 P.
(Continued on next page)
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Experiments in the Court Room
Although this article deals primarily with experiments con-
ducted outside of the court room and out of the presence of the
jury, it is now generally held that experiments may be per-
formed in the presence of the jury.1 '
In Osborne v. the City of Detroit,12 for example, where plain-
tiff claimed to be paralyzed by a fall, it was not error to permit
her medical attendant, who had not been sworn, to demonstrate
her loss of feeling to the jury by thrusting a pin into the side of
the claimant who claimed to be paralyzed.
(Continued from preceding page)
1094, 72 A. L. R. 860 (1930); Adskin v. Oregon-Washington-Laraway
Navigation Co., 134 Ore. 574, 294 P. 605 (1931); Raymond Syndicate v.
American Radio & Research Corporation, 263 Mass. 147, 60 N. E. 821 (1901);
City of Manchester v. Beavers, 38 Geo. App. 337, 144 S. E. 11 (1928); New
York Life Insurance Co. v. Alman, 22 Fed. 2d 98 (C. C. A. Ala., 1927),
cert. den., 48 S. Ct. 433, 277 U. S. 586, 72 L. Ed. 1000; Mauldin v. Auto
Schwill and Co., 1 Tex. App. 347 (1925); Erickson's Dairy Products Co. v.
Northwest Baker Ice Machine Co., 165 Ore. 563, 109 P. 2d 53 (1941); Wilson
v. Chippewa Valley Elec. Railway Co., 135 Wis. 18, 114 N. W. 462 (1908);
St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. McMichael, 115 Ark. 101, 171 S. W. 115
(1914); St. Louis I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Kimbrell, 117 Ark. 475, 174 S. W.
1183 (1915); Hall v. Brown, 102 Ore. 389, 202 P. 719 (1921) at best it is
within the discretion of the court to admit any testimony whatever about
experiments of similar occurrences, but in any event the condition must
appear to be substantially the same, and unless this appears it is not within
the discretion of the court to admit the evidence); Eidt v. Cutter, 127 Mass.
522 (1879) (experts may give the grounds and reasons for their opinions,
including the details of experiments made by them under conditions and
circumstances which are as nearly as possible like those in the case); and,
Cf., Hallawell vs. Union Oil Co. of California, 36 Cal. App. 367, 173 P. 177
(1918) (bystander at experiment, though not assisting to make it, may
testify as to its results, if he had knowledge of all conditions and experiment
was one involving no special technical knowledge or was such that its re-
sult could be seen and understood by persons of ordinary experience).
11 Stearns Coal & Lumber Co. v. Williams, 177 Kan. 698, 198 S. W. 54
(1917) (in servant's action for injuries from electric shock a court properly
refused to permit expert electrician to make experiment on plaintiff and
to show that volume of electricity which passed through wires could be
withstood by plaintiff without injury).
12 32 Fed. 36 (C. C. Mich., 1886); Air Reduction Co. v. Philadelphia Stor-
age Battery Co., 14 Fed. 2d 734 (C. C. A. Penn., 1926) (testimony of expert
witness as to result of experiments held properly admitted in view of objec-
tion to experiments in court); Leonard v. Southern Pacific Co., 21 Ore. 555,
28 P. 887, 15 L. R. A. 221 (1892) (where defendant claimed that the wreck
in which plaintiff was injured was due to a rail thrown across the track
by some third party, and introduced a rail in court which showed a scar
which defendant claimed was made in the manner stated, it was not error
to allow the plaintiff, in rebuttal, to produce a wheel and an iron rail of
the same dimensions as the rail produced by defendant, and allow a witness
to demonstrate to the jury that the scar on the rail was not caused in the
manner contended).
11 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (3)
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Historical Development
In some early cases the courts exhibited reluctance to admit
evidence of experiments; the reason assigned for such reluctance
was that to admit such evidence would permit a party to manu-
facture evidence in his own favor, and furthermore, that if
evidence of some experiments were admitted, others relating to
the same subject would also have to be admitted on behalf of
the opposite party, thus, raising too many collateral issues. Ex-
periments, however, serve to put the jury in possession of certain
knowledge important to the determination of the issues. Thus,
often such experiments may afford evidence more satisfactory
or reliable than oral testimony. The courts now very generally
permit experiments to be performed in the court in the presence
of the jury, or evidence to be given of experiments performed
out of the court when they are made under conditions similar
to those existing in the case at issue for the purpose of pro-
viding facts in issue.13 The selection on Evidence in American
jurisprudence states that similarity of conditions must be shown,
as a prerequisite. 14
In Libby, McNeil & Libby v. Scherman,15 decided by the
Supreme Court of Illinois, in an action caused by falling over of a
pile of pork barrels shortly after the contents of one of the bar-
rels had been removed, evidence of experiments made with simi-
lar piles of barrels and inferences drawn by witnesses in such
experiments were held inadmissible as pertaining to mere col-
lateral matters. Reluctance to admit experimental evidence was
shown in the opinion, written by Chief Justice Bailey, which
stated:
We are clearly of the opinion that experiments of that
character and their results and the inferences drawn from
them, experiments by witnesses, were mere collateral mat-
ters, which would have no legitimate bearing upon the issues
before the jury. Besides the impossibility of showing that
the conditions under which these experiments were made,
were in all respects identical with those existing at the time
the plaintiff was injured, and the multitude of collateral
issues which an attempt to prove identity of conditions
would raise, the fact that one experiment had been con-
ducted to a successful issue would have little if any ten-
dency to show that in another case precisely like it, an ac-
cident might not have happened.
13 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, Sec. 755, at 627; 32 C. J. S., Evidence, Sec. 592.
14 20 Am. Jur., supra, n. 13.
15 146 Ill. 343; 34 N. E. 801 (1893).
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The trend of the decisions in various American jurisdictions
over the last half century has been away from the "identity of
conditions" stated in Justice Bailey's decision in the Libby, Mc-
Neil & Libby case. Now the requirement of identical similarity
has given way to the requirement of "substantial similarity."
Thus, Streit v. Kestel,'G was an action by a passenger for injuries
sustained when her automobile allegedly turned from the curb
lane into the middle lane and commenced a wide right turn into
an intersecting street and then was struck by defendant's follow-
ing automobile traveling at the curb. There was no error
prejudicial to plaintiff in admitting motion pictures into evidence.
Judge Honsicker stated: "Testimony relating to experiments
made out of the presence of the jury have been admitted into
evidence for many years. These experiments must be made under
conditions of substantial similarity to the occurrence in issue."
Illustrations of Experiments Conducted Outside the Courtroom
Railroad Cases
In a Massachusetts decision involving the Northern Railway,
in 1856, it was held that an expert who had testified to the state
of the weather at a certain time and place, and as to his opinion
about the effect of such weather upon a certain substance, as de-
duced from many experiments, cannot be asked in his examina-
tion-in-chief about the details of each experiment.
17
Brooke v. Chicago, R. I. & T. Railway Co.' s (distinguished
from the earlier case of Klanowski v. Grand Trunk Railway
Co.19 ) involved evidence as to experiments of the witness in plac-
ing his foot between the rails of a railroad track in order to see
whether his foot would catch. There had been testimony that
the deceased's foot had caught. The experimental evidence was
admissible when the witness who made the experiment and the
shoe worn by the deceased at the time of the accident, were both
before the jury.
16 108 Ohio App. 241; 161 N. E. 2d 409 (1959); Roberts v. Permanente Corpo-
ration, 10 Cal. Rep. 519 (Cal. App., 1961); First National Insurance Co. v.
Wichita Flour Mills Co., 257 Fed. 2d 983 (C. C. A. Wis., 1959).
17 Ingledew v. Northern Railway, 73 Mass. 86 (1856).
18 81 Ia. 504, 47 N. W. 74 (1890).
19 31 N. W. 275 (Mich., 1887); Gilbert v. Third Ave. Railway Inc. Co., 54
N. Y. 270 (Supr. Ct., 1887) (evidence of experiments of a witness as to
whether a person, caused to fall from the steps of a streetcar by its start-
ing, would fall as the plaintiff testified he did, is admissible).
Sept., 1962
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As it became well established that the results of experi-
ments conducted out of court could be introduced into evidence
the years approaching the twentieth century brought a deluge
of cases involving railroads. 20  The beginning of the 20th cen-
tury saw no letup in the number of cases filed, involving one
aspect or another of the admissibility of expert or lay testimony
concerning experiments conducted outside the courtroom.2 1
20 See, Chicago, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Champion, 32 N. E. 874 (Ind., 1892)
(where the issue is to whether or not a car, while being pushed at about
four miles an hour, with brakes set, down a slight grade, coupled with
another car, did jump forward at the release of the brakes, when within
six or eight inches of the car with which it was to be coupled, it is error
to exclude the result of an experiment made at the same place under
exactly similar conditions); Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v. Mugg, 132 Ind. 168,
31 N. E. 564 (1892) (in an action against a railway company for the death
of plaintiff's intestate, it appeared that the deceased was injured in January,
and the statements by him were introduced in evidence that at the time the
injury occurred, his boot froze to the rail. Defendant offered to show
when the statement was made that one who heard such statement experi-
mented on the same day, and found that the weather had the same effect
on his boot. It was not shown that the conditions of the weather, etc., were
the same as when the deceased was injured. Held, that the court properly
excluded such evidence); Chicago and A. R. Co. v. Logue, 47 Ill. App. 292
(1893) (in an action by an administrator against the railroad company for
negligently killing plaintiff's intestate, the testimony of persons who placed
an inanimate object on the track, as to the distance at which it could be
seen, is inadmissible, if the surrounding circumstances are entirely
different from those attending the accident); Burg v. Chicago, R. I. & P.
Railway Co., 90 Iowa, 106, 57 N. W. 680, 48 Am. St. Rep. 419 (1894) (an
action against a railroad company for killing a person on its track, on the
question of whether the train could have stopped after deceased could have
been seen by the engineer, evidence of tests made by the defendant under
similar circumstances is admissible although plaintiff was not present when
tests were made); Byers v. Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 94 Tenn. 345, 29
S. W. 128 (1895); Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Moffatt, 56 Kan. 664, 44
P. 607 (1896) (where it was claimed that an intervening bluff, along which
a railway was built, prevented the traveler approaching the crossing from
hearing the ordinary signals, it is competent to show, by a witness who has
made a test in the place of injury and under substantially similar circum-
stances, how far the signals can be heard, and the effect of the intervening
bluff in obscuring the vision, and deadening the sounds made by the passing
train).
21 See, Atlanta & W. D. R. Co. v. Hudson, 2 Ga. App. 352, 58 S. W. 500
(1907) (in a suit against a railroad company for killing stock, where the
issue is whether the stock could have been seen on the track by the engi-
neer, plaintiff could prove the results of experiments made after the acci-
dent when they were made at the place of the accident and under con-
ditions similar to those surrounding the accident); Carolina Portland Ce-
ment Co. v. Marshall, 9 Ga. App. 558, 71 S. E. 942 (1908); Standard Oil Co.
v. Regan, 15 Ga. App. 571, 84 S. E. 69 (1915); Elgin A & S Traction Co. v.
Wilson, 120 Ill. App. 371, affd. 217 Ill. 47, 75 N. E. 436 (1905); Harrison v.
Southern Railway Co., 93 Miss. 40, 46 S. 408 (1908) (in an action for the
death of a child run over by the defendant's passenger train, where
plaintiff's theory was that the engineer could have seen and should have
seen the child in time to stop the engine, and that between the place
(Continued on next page)
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The classic fact situation in many railroad cases involving
experiments outside the courtroom is the distance at which an
adult or a child can be seen on the railroad tracks by the person
operating the engine.22
(Continued from preceding page)
where the engineer blew his whistle and the place where the child was
struck, the engineer could have put on emergency brakes and stopped the
engine before reaching the child. Evidence of experiments made at the
place at the same time of day and under similar climactic conditions tend-
ing to show the distance at which a child of the same size as the one killed
could have been seen on the track, was admissible); Houston & T. C. & R.
Co. v. Ramsey, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 603, 97 S. W. 1067 (1909) (in an action
for the death of one who was run over by a train the engineer testified
that he did not discover that the object on the track was a man until the
train was within 750 feet of the man, and the plaintiff introduced evidence
of experiments to test how far a man could be seen. One experiment hav-
ing been made about 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon and the other late in the
afternoon. In one case, a man about six feet high and in his shirtsleeves,
wearing a white shirt, was placed on the track at about the place of the
accident, and witnesses took their positions on the track at a distance of
1.000 yards, and then testified that the man could be plainly seen. The
other experiment was made under same circumstances and the result was
the same. There was some evidence tending to show that the time of the
accident was about or after sundown. Held, that the evidence as to the
experiments was admissible); Johnson v. Chicago, R. I. and P. R. Co., 80
Kan. 456, 103 P. 90 (1909); Wingfield v. McClintock, 85 Kan. 207, 113 P. 393,
affd. on rehearing 5 Kan. 452, 116 P. 488 (1911); Green v. Long Island Rail-
way Co., 115 N. Y. S. 509, 131 App. Div. 227 (1909) (held that the admission
of evidence as to a test before the trial as to how far a red light could be
seen on the track under circumstances like those on the night of the acci-
dent was error); Nelson v. Old Colony Street Railway Co., 408 Mass. 159, 94
N. E. 313 (1911) (in an action for personal injuries experiments made by
a surveyor at the place of the accident held competent); Burton v. Chicago
& A. Railway Co., 176 Mo. App. 14, 162 S. W. 1064 (1914); Wells v. Lusk,
188 Mo. App. 63, 173 S. W. 750 (1915); R. A. Watson Orchards v. New York
C. & St. L. R. Co., 250 Ill. App. 222 (1929) (in an action against a railroad
company for the destruction by fire of a storage plant in which regranu-
lated cork was used for the purpose of insulation, testimony of the results
of experiments testing the inflammability of regranulated cork was admis-
sible when it was shown that the experiments were performed under the
same conditions as existed at the time of the fire, as where the witness
testified that he was the superintendent of the cork manufacturing plant
and that the cork products with respect to which he testified were of the
same kind as were used to insulate plants such as the one destroyed);
Vandalia Railway Co. v. Duling, 60 Ind. App. 332, 109 N. E. 70 (1915) (in
an action against a railroad for killing horses that escaped onto its right-of-
way, evidence as to experiments to discover how far the engine's head-
lights would show objects on the track, the conditions being practically
similar with those at the time of the accident, was admissible); Winters v.
Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 131 Minn. 181, 154 N. W. 964 (1915) (exclusion
of evidence as to experiments made with a jack and lever on the day follow-
ing the injury to the plaintiff employee, held not error); Going's Admin-
istratrix v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co., 119 Va. 543, 89 S. E. 914, affd.
39 Cir. Ct. 22, 248 U. S., 538, 63 L. Ed. 409 (1918); Meaney v. Portland Elec-
tric Power Co., 131 Ore. 140, 282 P. 113 (1929); Kratche v. New York Cen-
tral Railway Co., 240 N. Y. S. 443, 228 App. Div. 820 (1930).
22 Owen v. Delano, 194 S. W. 756 (Mo. App., 1917) (engineer distinguished
(Continued on next page)
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Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Henderson,2"3 in the Su-
preme Court of Appeals of Virginia, was an action for death of
a child struck by a railroad train. The defendant's engineer
testified that he saw the child in time to stop but did not recog-
nize it as a child. Judge Kelly stated in his opinion:
One of the differences pointed out is that the engineer was
on an engine, the motion and vibration of which would in-
terfere with his clear vision . . . There were two or more
of these experiments made by sundry persons. Some when
the day was perfectly clear and others in dark and cloudy
weather. A child of about the size of the one who was killed
and similarly dressed, was placed at the same place and in
substantially the same position and the witness in question
then went up the track to see how far away they could recog-
nize the object as a child. The result of the testimony was
that, when the day was clear, they could recognize the ob-
ject as a child. The result of the testimony was that, when
the day was clear, they could recognize the child at a
distance of something like 1,100 feet away, and that on a
cloudy day they could identify it at a distance of 900 feet.
These witnesses of course, knew from the outset what the
object was, but they were very positive in their testimony
that under weather conditions as above indicated, they could
clearly and unquestionably recognize a child as such at the
respective distance as stated. One of the differences pointed
out is that the engineer was on an engine, the motion and
(Continued from preceding page)
a person on the track); Gulf C. & S. F. Railway Co. v. Whitfield, 206 S. W.
380 (Tex. Civ. App., 1918) (experiments showing the distance at which a
man sitting on the end of a tie at the place of the accident could be seen
by a person in the locomotive cab); Griggs v. Dunham, 204 S. W. 573, re-
versed State ex rel. Dunham v. Ellison, 213 S. W. 459 (Mo. App., 1919);
Ballman v. H. A. Lueking Teaming Co., 281 Mo. 342, 219 S. W. 603 (1920);
Alabama G. S. Ry. Co. v. Burgess, 144 Ala. 587, 22 S. 169 (1919); Norfolk
& W. Railway Co. v. Henderson, 132 Va. 297 (1920) (in an action for death
of child playing upon a railroad track, evidence of experiments as to the
distance at which a child similarly dressed and situated could have been
recognized as a child was not incompetent because the experiments were
made by a person standing on the track and not by the engineer from a
moving train, especially where there was expert testimony that the engi-
neer would have a better opportunity to recognize the object as a child
than would the person on the track); Baker v. Loftin, 222 S. W. 195 (Tex.,
1920) (in an action for death of a person on track at night, evidence
of experiments made under similar conditions for the purpose of demon-
strating that the headlight of an engine did not leave the track in darkness
because of a curved track, was admissible); Neice v. Norfolk and Western
Railway Co., 155 Va. 211, 154 S. E. 563 (1930) (experiment tending to
show that child could be seen on railroad track from 600 to 1200 feet from
the crossing, held properly excluded); Alabama Great Southern Railway
Co. v. Johnson, 140 Fed. 2d 968 (C. C. A. Miss., 1944).
23 132 Va. 297; 111 S. E. 277 (1922).
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vibration of which would interfere with clear vision, while
the witnesses who were making the test, were on the
ground . .. Moreover, and perhaps even more to the point,
the engineer in charge of the engine, after saying that he
did not think these tests were fair, upon being asked to
specify the reason why he did not think they were fair, said,
"Knowing a thing is there and having your mind to help
you out, makes a great deal of difference." This was a
pointed, sensible, comprehensive answer; and, it is this dif-
ference, very appropriately called in the petition for the writ
of error, "the difference in the mental attitudes of the
parties," which this defendant chiefly relies upon, and in
view of the testimony must solely rely upon, is the reason
why the evidence should not have been admitted. (Emphasis
added.)
Judge Kelly commented upon what had been called "the
mental attitude of the parties." He said: "We must say, therefore,
that the real question as to the admissibility of these tests is
whether the fact that the witnesses making them knew from the
outset the child had been placed on the tracks constitutes such
difference between their situation and that of the engineer and
others with him in the engine as to render the test incompetent
as evidence. The position of the defendant in this respect does
not seem to us to be well taken. We do not mean to say that
this difference is of no consequence, but we think that its effect
on the value of the test as proof was the question to be de-
termined by the jury."
The Norfolk & Western Railway Co. case,2 4 is one of the
earliest decisions pointing out the very real difference between
the experiment and the actual occurrence of the event as in-
dicated by the "mental attitude" of the witness conducting the
experiment.
A number of the cases involving the distance at which an
object could be identified (at a railroad crossing) by the en-
gineer in the cab of an engine, centered on the similarity of con-
ditions as to light and the speed of the train. Few of the cases
pointed out, as did counsel in the Norfolk & Western Railway
Co. case, the attitude of the person conducting the experiment
as to previous knowledge concerning the reason for the experi-
ment.
As Judge Kelly stated,25 the difference in the "mental at-
24 Ibid.
25 Supra, n. 23; Jones, Evidence, Sec. 455, at 64, "A court may in the exer-
(Continued on next page)
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titude" of the witness conducting the experiment must go to its
weight and not to its admissibility. It is impossible to reestablish
complete similarity of conditions such as existed at the time of
the occurrence in question.
Accordingly, since the courts have decided that substantial
similarity is sufficient to render an experiment admissible, cer-
tainly substantial similarity of the mental attitude of the witness
involved in the experiment is sufficient to render the experiment
admissible.
In Sherrill v. State, 26 the question was whether certain wit-
nesses could have seen the place of the accident without difficulty,
on account of trees and brush between them and it. Others
had, before the trial and some months after the accident, gone
to the scene to experiment in order to determine that question.
The court held that such evidence was not competent. The
state of the foliage on the trees and the brush was a controlling
condition in that respect. After four months, such foliage was
so changed as to be no assurance as to its condition before.
Other cases involving rail transportation have included ex-
periments to determine the heat in the cab of an engine in an
action for a fatal heart stroke; 27 experiments concerning sparks
emanated from the stack of an engine through an arrester;
2s
experiments as to distances within which trains could be
stopped;29 experiments to demonstrate the obstruction of the
engineer's view of the accident by reason of curves or cuts in
(Continued from preceding page)
cise of judicial discretion, allow parties within reasonable limits to conduct
experiment tests in the presence of the jury in order to illustrate the testi-
mony in the case." Annotations, 103 A. L. R. 1355; 23 A. L. R. 2d 1306; 28
A. L. R. 2d 1115; 35 A. L. R. 2d 856, 46 A. L. R. 2d 1216; and Carpenter v.
Kurm, 348 Mo. 1132, 157 S. W. 2d 213 (1943).
26 138 Ala. 325, 35 S. 129 (1903).
27 Ruud v. Minneapolis St. Street Railway Co., 202 Minn. 480, 279 N. W.
224 (1938) (in proceeding to recover compensation for fatal heart strokes
suffered by motorman while operating streetcar during extremely hot
weather, Industrial Commission did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
admit evidence of experiments made several months later to determine
the amount of heat discharged in motorman's cab in course of operation
of car which motorman had been operating).
28 Thomas Roberts-Stevenson Co. v. Philadelphia Railway Co., 256 Pa. 549,
100 A. 998 (1917) (in an action for damage by fire, it was not reversible
error to permit defendant's witness to testify to the results of experiments
showing that sparks from bituminous coal expanded after leaving the stack
and might be larger than openings in arrester meshes).
29 Washington v. Long Island Railway Co., 214 N. Y. S. 2d 115 (1961).
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the embankment;3 0 and experiments to show the safest way for
a traveler to negotiate a railway crossing.3 1
Trackless Trolleys
A trackless trolley and street car have provided interesting
experiments which include: experiments to determine the posi-
tion where a heel on a shoe would catch on a plate on a streetcar
as a passenger alighted;3 2 tests to determine the distance at
which a man could be seen lying upon the track; 33 evidence
regarding a witness's time spent on a streetcar subsequent to an
accident; 34 experiments as to the distance in which a streetcar
could stop;3 5 and experiments made to ascertain the maximum
speed attainable by a streetcar. 36
Graza v. San Antonio Transit Co.,37 was an action by a
passenger for injuries allegedly sustained when a bus door closed
on her hand as she was about to board, and further injuries
suffered when the bus started with the passenger's hand caught
in the door. It was held that testimony as to experiments by other
persons, under substantially similar conditions, which indicated
that the door would not cause such injuries, was admissible.
Automobiles
The fact situation that provided many illustrations of experi-
ments in railway cases is duplicated in auto accident cases. The
distance at which objects can be identified upon a road open for
travel by automobiles is the subject of many automobile cases
involving experiments.
38
30 Atlantic Coast Line Railway Co. v. Jackson, 225 Ala. 652, 114 S. 813
(1933).
31 Torgeson v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Ry. Co., 124 Kan. 798, 262 P. 546,
55 A. L. R. 1535 (1928)
32 Emerson v. Chicago City Railway Co., 203 Ill. App. 412 (1917).
33 Griggs v. Kansas City Railway Co., 89 Tex. Cir. Rep. 87, 228 S. W. 508
(1921).
34 Dallas Railway and Terminal Co. v. Darden, 38 S. W. 2d 777, affg. 23
S. W. 2d 739 (Tex., 1931).
35 Long v. Galveston Electric Co., 59 S. W. 2d 288 (Tex. Civ. App., 1933).
36 Bughlin v. Pittsburgh County Railway Co., 169 Okla. 106, 36 P. 2d 32,
94 A. L. R. 1180 (1934).
37 180 S. W. 2d 1006 (Tex. Civ. App., 1944).
38 Linstroth v. Pepper, 203 Mo. App. 278, 218 S. W. 431 (1920) (in action
for death of an infant son who, while crossing the street was run over and
(Continued on next page)
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Ortega v. Pacific Greyhound Lines,3" was an action for death
of a boy who was struck by a bus at night while he was riding
on a bicycle. The question in issue was whether the reflector
mirror on the rear of the bicycle was sufficient under the statute.
There was admission of testimony of a witness that during an
experiment he was able to see the same kind of reflector mirror
on a bicycle more than 200 feet ahead of his automobile. It was
held not reversible error when the bicycle used in the experi-
ment, and the bicycle and the reflector mirrors involved in the
accident, and the condition of both were observed by the jury.
Thomas v. Central Greyhound Lines, Inc.40 was an action for
personal injuries sustained by a passenger when the corporate
defendant's bus, in which he was riding, collided with the co-
defendant's approaching truck, on a straight section of highway.
(Continued from preceding page)
killed by defendant's automobile, one of the defenses being that the
chauffeur could not by exercise of reasonable care have seen the son in
time to have prevented the accident, held that there was no error in per-
mitting an expert witness to state his conclusion from an experiment as to
what obstruction a telephone pole near the curb line was to a view of the
street in question); Smith v. Grange Mutual Fire Insurance Co. of Michi-
gan, 234 Mich. 119, 208 N. W. 145 (1926); Birmingham Stove and Range Co.
v. Wanderford, 217 Ala. 342, 116 S. 334 (1928) (admission of testimony as to
points of visibility to and from corner which was scene of collision, based
on experiments long after accident, held error); Havecker v. Weiss, 261
N. Y. S. 494, 237 App. Div. 856 (1933) (excluding evidence of what could
be seen from a point 466 feet from where the accident happened, because
photographs showing intervening crest of road were evidence, held error,
notwithstanding that testimony was based on result of experiments made
after accident); Bill v. Kenney, 181 Va. 24, 23 S. E. 2d 781 (1943) (where
occupant of automobile riding in back seat testified that truck driver was
on wrong side of road and that he did not dim his lights, evidence regard-
ing experiments purporting to show that person sitting in back seat could
not see things testified to by occupant was irrelevant, and absence of
evidence showing that experiment was conducted under similar circum-
stances as existed at the time of the accident); American Products Co. v.
Villwock, 7 Wash. 2d 246, 109 P. 2d 570, 132 A. L. R., 1010 (1941); Hodgkins
v. Christopher, 58 N. Mex. 637, 274 P. 2d 153 (1951) (in an action for wrong-
ful death of occupant of pick-up truck which was struck in the rear by a
tank-trailer, court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence
testimony concerning an experiment conducted for the purpose of collabo-
rating testimony of one who was riding in cab of pick-up truck that he
was able to see the tank-trailer); Mintz v. Atlantic Coastline Railway Co.,
236 N. C. 109, 72 S. E. 2d 38 (1954); Cunningham v. Court, 82 N. W. 2d 292
(Iowa, 1957); McGough v. Hendrikson, 58 Cal. App. 2d 60, 136 P. 2d
110 (1943) (evidence of experiment made at place of automobile accident,
showing that injured person was plainly visible to motorist, was inadmissible
when experiment was made at 9:30 P. M. in October, the accident having
occurred at 2:30 a. m. in May, and no foundation was laid as to whether
the conditions existing in October were substantially similar to those
existing in May).
39 20 Cal. App. 596, 67 P. 2d 702 (1937).
40 6 A. D. 2d 649; 180 N. Y. S. 2d 461 (1960).
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It was held to be improper to exclude testimony of an experiment
conducted with the bus involved, establishing incapacity on the
part of the passengers in the bus, by reason of physical circum-
stances, to see a line 6 to 12 inches from and parallel with the left
side of the bus. The passenger had testified that shortly before
the accident he observed the center line of the highway 6 to 12
inches left of the left side of the bus, but that he lost sight of the
center line immediately prior to the collision. Evidence as to
experiments under the circumstances was relevant with regard
to the bus company and its driver's steering.
Experiments as to the distance within which automobiles can
be stopped at various speeds have been the subject of numerous
out of court experiments. In Beckley v. Alexander,4 1 in 1914, one
of the earliest experiments concerning the stopping of an auto-
mobile was conducted out of the presence of the jury. The court
held that because of dissimilarity of conditions, exclusion of the
evidence was within the discretion of the trial court.
Following the Beckley decision, the courts were presented
in the 20's and 30's, and later, with suits concerning the admis-
sibility of experiments as to the distance at which an automobile
may be stopped.4 2 In Lemons v. Holland,43 it was held that, in
41 77 N. H. 255, 90 A. 878 (1914).
42 Truva v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 124 Wash. 445, 214 P. 818 (1923);
Kelly v. Troy Laundry Co., 46 Idaho 214, 267 P. 222 (1928); Siegel v. De-
troit Cab Co., 246 Mich. 620, 225 N. W. 601 (1929) (tests of whether taxicab
being operated at 20 m.p.h. could be stopped within two feet, held
admissible, in an action for death of pedestrian struck by similar car);
R. F. Trant, Inc. v. Upton, 159 Va. 355, 165 S. E. 404 (1932); Clevenger v.
Kern, 100 Ind. App. 581, 197 N. E. 731 (1935) (in death action against a
motorist, admission of testimony of expert automobile mechanic regarding
results of experiments made after an accident relating to ability to stop
defendant's automobile, under conditions practically the same as those
existing on the day of the accident, held not in error. Judge Wood stated:
" . . this related mostly to the ability to stop the automobile while it was
being operated at a given speed, all the conditions under which the experi-
ments were made were practically the same as those existing on the day
of the accident. The court did not abuse its discretion . . . Its weight in
credibility were matters for the jury to determine."); Vandalia Railway
Co. v. Bulling, 60 Ind. App. 332, 109 N. E. 70 (1915); Boston Rubber Co.
v. Kendall, 178 Mass. 232, 59 N. E. 657, 51 L. R. A. 781 (1901); Nelson v.
Old Colony Street Railway Co., 208 Mass. 159, 94 N. E. 313 (1911); Poole
v. Day, 143 Kan. 226, 53 P. 2d 912 (1936); Crecelius v. Gamble, Skogmo
Inc., 144 Neb. 394, 13 N. W. 2d 627 (1944) (in an action for injuries sus-
tained by a four year old boy struck by a truck, trial court did not abuse
its discretion in admitting evidence of experiment conducted by police
officer at scene of accident more than two and a half years thereafter with
a truck with brakes adjusted as on the truck involved in the accident);
Franks v. Kirbon, 146 Neb. 585, 20 N. W. 2d 597 (1945); McBrayer v.
Ballenger, 95 S. E. 2d 718 (Ga. App., 1957) (in an action for injuries sus-
(Continued on next page)
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any negligence case, information in a chart purporting to set
forth distances in which an automobile, with brakes in excellent
condition, might be stopped when traveling at certain speeds
would be of no value unless experiments were first shown to have
been performed under conditions substantially similar to those
present at the time and place in controversy.
Bell v. Kroger Co.44 was an action for death of a motorist
resulting from collision with a truck. This involved a "tacto-
graph," which is an instrument containing a clock with a paper
dial attached, which is fastened onto a motor of a truck in such
a manner that a needle will indicate on the paper dial the speed
of the truck at any given time, and also each truck stop. Admis-
sion of this evidence was error where there was insufficient proof
of accuracy of such tactograph, which had been placed on the
truck some three years prior to the collision.
The automobile mechanic also has played an important role
in the introduction of out of court experiments in civil jury trials.
An automobile mechanic's experiment with a cardboard window
in an automobile was held inadmissible in an action for a motor-
ist's death, where the defendant claimed that the cardboard had
obstructed his view.4 5
Sundry other experiments have been conducted with auto-
mobiles, including experiments tending to show how an auto-
mobile would lessen its speed on an incline approaching a
bridge; 46 an experiment attempting to indicate the impossibility
of placing one's hand past the magneto gear while the engine of
an automobile was running; 47 an experiment designed to show
(Continued from preceding page)
tained by plaintiff as a result of head-on collision between automobile in
which he was passenger and defendant's automobile, it was not error to
admit testimony of police officer relative to certain tests he had made in
relation to correlation between automobile speed, and stopping distance,
where test had been conducted with automobile of same make and model
as defendant's on same stretch of highway under comparable weather
conditions).
43 286 Ore. 656 (1961); Ervay-Canton Apts. v. Hatterick, 239 S. W. 2d 150
(Tex. Civ. App., 1951); Coon v. Utah Const. Co., 288 P. 2d 997 (Utah, 1957);
Cf., Lane v. Hampton, 197 Va. 46, 87 S. E. 2d 803 (1955); Reber v. Hanson,
260 Wis. 362, 51 N. W. 505 (1892); Schwartz v. Schneuriger, 269 Wis. 535,
69 N. W. 2d 756 (1956).
44 323 S. W. 2d 424 (Ark., 1959); Publix Camco v. Colorado National Bank
of Denver, 338 P. 2d 702 (Colo., 1959).
45 Potts v. Bird, 93 Colo. 587, 27 P. 2d 745 (1934); Gaillard v. Boynton, 70
Fed. 2d 552 (C. C. A., N. H., 1934).
46 Collins v. Graves, 17 Cal. App. 2d 288, 61 P. 2d 1198 (1936).
47 McCarthy v. Currie, 240 Mass. 442, 134 N. E. 339 (1922).
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that an automobile parked as plaintiff's automobile was parked
would coast downhill onto a highway after some movement caus-
ing the automobile to start;48 an experiment conducted to indicate
the amount of time taken by a pedestrian to cross a street
occupied by motor vehicles; 49 an experiement to determine the
speed of a vehicle by the use of a constable's stopwatch;50 experi-
ments and tests conducted upon a defective steering gear of an
automobile; 5'1 and experiments conducted concerning defective
brakes on a truck.52
In Chambers v. Silver,;' a collision occurred when the
defendant's automobile veered onto the wrong side of the road.
The sole defense was that the main leaf in the spring of the
front wheel was broken when the wheel crossed a two-inch
deposit of soil on the road. The vehicle had thereby been ren-
48 Navajo Freight Lines Inc. v. Mahaffey, 174 Fed. 2d 503 (10th. Cir., 1949)
(in an automobile accident case, exclusion of results of experiment designed
to show that automobile parked as plaintiff's automobile was parked would
coast downhill onto highway after some movement causing automobile to
start, if emergency brake was released and automobile was not in gear,
was not an abuse of discretion, where there was no showing that similar
automobile was used in experiment, and that climatic conditions and wind
resistance were same at the time of accident and experiment, and proffered
testimony was cumulative and would serve only to prove undisputed facts.
District Judge Savage stated, "The party offering evidence of out-of-court
experiments must lay a proper foundation by showing a similarity of cir-
cumstances and conditions. The admission of experimental testimony is a
matter resting largely with the discretion of the trial court); Beckley v.
Alexander, 77 N. H. 255, 90 A. 878 (1914); National Pressure Cooker v.
Stroeter, 50 Fed. 2d 642 (7th Cir., 1931); Collins v. Graves, 17 Cal. App. 2d
288, 61 P. 2d 1198 (1936); Hisler v. State, 52 Fla. 30, 42 S. 692, 695 (1906)
(". . . Evidence of this kind should be received with caution and only be
admitted when it is obvious to the court, from the nature of the experi-
ments, that the jury will be enlightened, rather than confused. In many
instances, a slight change in the conditions under which the experiment is
made will so distort the results as to wholly destroy its value as evidence,
and make it harmful rather than helpful.").
49 Sewell v. MacRae, 323 P. 2d 236 (Wash., 1950) (in an action by pe-
destrian against automobile driver for injuries sustained when he was
struck by automobile at intersection controlled by traffic signals, experi-
ment used to establish that pedestrian started to cross the street after light
had turned amber toward him, by requiring pedestrian to walk 20 ft. in
presence of jury, during which time two stop watches were used to clock
his travel time, was too inconclusive, inaccurate and speculative to be of
any probative value); Barnes v. Labor Hall Association, 319 Fed. 2d 554
(Wash., 1958); Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Floyd, 249 Fed. 2d 396 (C. C. A.
Ga., 1958).
50 Pittman v. Baladez, 304 S. W. 2d 601 (Tex. Civ. App., 1958).
51 Bona v. X. R. Thomas Auto Co., 137 Ark. 217, 208 S. W. 306 (1918).
52 Slury v. Beesku, 139 Cal. App. 398, 33 P. 2d 1033 (1934).
53 103 Cal. App. 2d 633, 230 P. 2d 143 (1951); Larramendy v. Myres, 126 Cal.
App. 2d 636, 272 P. 2d 824 (1954); Alvarez v. Los Angeles County, 132 Cal.
App. 2d 525, 282 P. 2d 531 (1955).
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dered impossible to control. A mechanic testified for the de-
fendant that it was physically impossible to drive an automobile
with this type of suspension in such condition. It was prejudicial
error to refuse the plaintiff's rebuttal evidence as to an experi-
ment in which an automobile with the same suspension system
was driven without loss of control over 2 x 2 boards at a speed
of about 45-50 mph.
Handley v. Erb,54 was an action for death of a bicyclist who
was struck and thrown by a barrier rope which the defendant's
automobile broke, and on which rope there were three warning
flags. Testimony was given as to results of experiments con-
ducted six years after the accident and under different conditions,
by a witness who knew that the flags were there and was
specifically looking for them. This was inadmissible, and its
admission constituted prejudicial error, notwithstanding a state-
ment to the jury that the testimony was not admitted to show
negligence of the defendant, but solely to show no neglect on the
part of the defendant city.
Justice Dove, commenting upon what has been previously
been referred to as "the mental attitude" of the witness in the
experiment, stated in the Handley case:
The testimony permitted the jury to infer that if the witness,
who knew the flags were there and was specifically looking
for them, saw them at the points mentioned, then appellant,
who had no knowledge of the barrier, could have seen the
flags from the same point, regardless of whether there were
other conditions that might have obstructed his view. The
court statement to the jury as to the purpose of the testi-
mony would not erase that difference from their minds. The
testimony was highly prejudicial to the appellant and was
improperly admitted.
Airlines
Lobal v. American Airlines,55 was an action by a passenger in
defendant's airplane, for an injury sustained in a crash, appar-
ently as a result of engine trouble. Judge Clark stated in his
opinion: "The admissibility of the results of experiments con-
ducted by defendant's pilots showing the effect of a piece of paper
in the poppet valve in the fuel line was properly within the trial
court's discretion under the conditions of similarity, if not of
perfect identity, with that of the airplane in the accident."
54 314 Ill. App. 207, 41 N. E. 2d 222 (1942).
5 205 Fed. 2d 927 (2d Cir., 1953).
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Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Glenn L. Martin Co.,58 was an air-
line's action against the aircraft manufacturer for alleged negli-
gence in design and manufacture of airplane, whereby the wing
splice was vulnerable to metal fatigue. Judge Stewart stated:
The court was correct in excluding a report of certain ex-
periments conducted by the Aluminum Co. of America
Research Laboratory, after the faulty wing joint was dis-
covered. Northwest contends that this report should have
been admitted in rebuttal to show the relative merits of
various types of wing splice design. In view, however, of the
voluminous evidence of record showing the complicated inter-
play of stresses in a wing structure, the Aluminum Com-
pany experiments with isolated joints were of doubtful pro-
bative value. Report of the experiments was at fault, and
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the
danger of the reports confusing the jury outweighed its
materiality and relevance.
Scientific Experiments
Otey v. Hoyt,5 7 is the earliest known decision in the United
States concerning the use of some type of scientific experiment
the results of which were to be introduced to the jury. Since that
time the admissibility of out of court experiments conducted on
a scientific plane has been well settled.
A most interesting case in this classification is Coca Cola
Bottling Co. of Arkansas v. Breckenridge," an action to recover
judgment to compensate for illness, pain and suffering occasioned
by the swallowing of a spider which was contained in a bottle of
Coca Cola manufactured by the appellant. Judge Frank G. Smith
of the Supreme Court of Arkansas stated:
Two physicians testifying as experts in behalf of appellant,
expressed the opinion that appellee's condition had not and
could not have been caused by swallowing a spider. Dr.
Jilbury testified that he had specialized in bacteriological
work dealing with microcosms and bacteriae and was con-
sulting bacteriologist with several hospitals in Little Rock,
and that he had made certain experiments for the purpose
of testifying in this case. He had placed spiders in bottles of
Coca Cola, and put them in a warm place to stimulate the
decomposition-in an incubator kept at body temperature for
5G 224 Fed. 2d 120 (6th Cir., 1955), 350 U. S. 937; 2 Wigmore, Evidence,
Sec. 444 (3rd. ed., 1940).
57 47 N. C. 70 (1854).
58 196 Ark. 1177; 114 S. W. 2d 7 (1938).
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about 5 days and had thereafter injected some of the Coca
Cola into rabbits to see if any toxin developed, but none did,
and that he also made cultures from the bottles in sterile
culture media used for developing bacteria and found that
there was no bacterial growth. He further testified that
insects do not decompose in Coca Cola, as it has a preserva-
tive effect, and that he drank one bottle of Coca Cola which
had a mashed spider in it, and that he drank another bottle
which had spiders in it not mashed, without harmful effects.
The injection in the rabbits had no effect except a shock
which any injection in the vein will cause, and the rabbits
were all well the next day, and are still well, and that this is
the proper method of looking for toxins.
As the field of agriculture became more scientific, actions
concerning the admissibility of the results of experiments con-
cerning types of fertilizer, germination of seeds, etc., became more
numerous. Among these decisions were cases involving an ex-
periment to determine the point of drainage of the remaining
lands of a filter basin of a water work; 59 an experiment to
determine whether or not seeds would germinate;60 an experi-
ment analyzing the borax content of fertilizer; 61 an experiment
concerning the planting of wheat which produced no crop; 62 tests
concerning the analysis of cottonseed shipped upon a certain
date; 63 tests concerning the noxious qualities of an insecticide; 64
59 Williams v. Taunton, 125 Mass. 34 (1878).
o Western Soil Bacteria Co. v. O'Brien Bros., 49 Cal. App. 707, 194 P. 72
(1920) (in an action to recover purchase price of seed and a bacterial
preparation where defendant set up breach of warranty that the seed
would germinate, held that the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing
to permit plaintiff's witness to testify that he made a test of the seed by
placing 100 grains beween moistened blotters and subjecting them to
temperatures of 98 degrees for a specified time and that some of them
germinated).
61 Heal v. International Agrarian Corp., Buffalo Fertilizer Works, 124 Me.
138, 126 A. 644 (1925) (in an action for damage to potato crops by reason
of fertilizer sold containing borax harmful to plants, sample of fertilizer
purchased from defendant by plaintiff's neighbor held sufficiently identi-
fied to warrant the admission of evidence of an analysis thereof, and fact
that sample was taken from 50 pounds residue rather than from larger
quantities goes only to the weight of the evidence and not to the ad-
missibility).
62 Horne v. Elgin Warehouse Co., 96 Ore. 403, 190 P. 151 (1920).
63 Harris Cortner & Co. v. Union Cotton Oil Co., 208 Ala. 535, 94 S. 559
(1922).
64 Simpson v. American Oil Company, 219 N. C. 595, 14 S. E. 2d 638 (1941)
(in an action against manufacturer for injuries received from poisonous
effect of insecticide, test of a skin specialist on a group of five nurses and
internes for the purpose of ascertaining whether insecticide had noxious
qualities that were poisonous to humans was admissible).
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and the results of experiments by a doctor upon water samples
taken from a creek into which the city permitted untreated
sewage to flow, poisoning the plaintiff's cattle.65
Other miscellaneous experiments conducted under this gen-
eral topic heading of "scientific experiments" include experi-
ments as to the effects of vibrations on a pile of bonedust and a
piece of iron pipe;0 6 tests concerning burns from electric wires;67
tests upon an electric power motor in a breach of contract ac-
tion;68 tests as to the bacteriological examination of a piece of
ice;6 9 tests upon appliances causing death by electrocution;
7 °
tests concerning measurements of depressions caused by heavy
machinery upon a bridge; 71 analysis of samples; 72 an experiment
concerning the inflammability of paint; 73 experiments concerning
the mixture used by dentists in bridge casts;7 4 evidence concern-
65 Friesland v. Litchfield, 24 Ill. App. 2d 390, 164 N. E. 2d 606 (1960) (in an
action by farmer against city for loss of livestock and other damage re-
sulting when city permitted untreated sewage to flow into creek that
flowed through farmer's pasture, poisoning his cattle, testimony by a
doctor as to samples of water taken from creek some two months after
farmer had moved from the farm was not objectionable on ground of
remoteness, as the evidence indicated the nature of the creek water while
farmer had lived on the farm and city produced no evidence of change or
corrective steps taken. Presiding Justice Reynolds stated in his opinion,
"taking the evidence of the plaintiff, together with that of the inspector
of the Health State Department, all concerning the conditions of the water
in the creek while the plaintiff was on the farm, and in the absence of
any testimony of defendant, to show any change in conditions or that any
steps were taken to correct the conditions prevalent in 1956 and 1957,
would constitute a connected chain of evidence as to the condition of the
water in the creek and was admissible for what it was worth. The jury
could evaluate its weight").
66 Huggard v. Glucose Sugar Refining Company, 132 Iowa 724, 109 N. W.
475 (1906).
67 Rasmussen v. Wisconsin Traction Light, Heat & Power Co., 133 Wis. 205,
113 N. W. 458 (1907).
68 Kimball Bros. Co. v. Citizens Gas & Electric Co., 141 Iowa 632, 118 N. W.
891 (1908).
69 Interboro Brewing Co. v. Independent Consumers Ice Co., 156 N. Y. S.
410, 93 Misc. Rep. 24 (1915).
70 Smith, Administratrix v. Middlesboro Electric Co., 164 Ky. 46, 174 S. W.
773 (1915); Cf., Security Cement & Lime Co. v. Bowers, 124 Md. 11, 91 A.
834 (1914) (an experiment with a dusty sack which covered an opening in
the floor through which an employee fell, held inadmissible); Louisville
East & Electric Co. v. Duncan, 235 Ky. 613, 31 S. W. 2d 915 (1930).
71 Smith v. Sotover Manufacturing Co., 205 Ill. App. 169 (1917); Johnson
v. Gustafson, 233 Ill. App. 216 (1924); Langham v. Chicago R. I. & P. Rail-
way Co., 197 Iowa 1118, 198 N. W. 525 (1924).
72 Various cases on various substances.
73 Holland and Kerr v. Craven, 5 Tenn. App. 39 (1927).
74 Ley v. Bishop, 88 Cal. App. 313, 263 P. 369 (1928).
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ing tests made by a chemist as to the bacteriological content of
sausage;7 5 tests concerning the source and manner of keeping of
kerosene;76 experiments as to methods used by a person commit-
ting suicide in firing the gun; 77 an experiment conducted by a
layman concerning the evaporation of water; 78 laboratory experi-
ments conducted by an expert breaking bottles and observing
fractures; 79 analysis of contents of jars of gasoline stored for ap-
proximately two years;80 tests concerning the tension of an in-
flated tire;8 1 and the measuring of a surgical nail in an action
for misbranding surgical instruments.8
2
Occasionally courts have refused to admit the results of
experiments conducted on the scientific plane because of the lack
of identity of circumstances. None of the decisions have refused
to enter the result of scientific experiments because of the
"mental attitude" of the witness or expert conducting the experi-
ment. In the true scientific experiment, the human factor does
not enter into consideration as it does in many of the cases in-
volving the railroad, the trackless trolley or an automobile.
In Depfer v. Walker,83 a physician was appointed by the
court to make an examination of the injured party. It was held
that he could not testify as to the extent of the injury based solely
on the report of the examination made by a technician, although
testimony of such examiner as to the result of the examination
may be predicated for a physician's opinion or examination.
Scientific experiments which have been excluded from the
trial of the civil cases before juries, for the lack of the essential
element of substantial similarity, include an analysis of the
water in a stream by a chemist in an action for damages alleged
to have resulted from oil well operators permitting salt water to
75 Housand v. Armour and Co., 173 S. C. 268, 175 S. E. 516 (1934).
76 Warrichait v. Standard Oil Co., 213 Wis. 612, 252 P. 187 (1934).
77 Hopkins v. E. I. Dupont Company, 199 Fed. 2d 930 (C. A. 3, 1952);
Canada Life Assurance Co. v. Houston, 241 Fed. 2d 523 (C. A. 9, 1957).
78 Dancigerol Refining Co. v. Donahey, 238 P. 2d 308 (Okla., 1952) (a
layman could properly conduct an evaporation experiment by taking water
from his well and water and soils from a depression in a draw near such
well, and by a process of evaporation, produce a residue, and from actual
taste testify that the resulting residue and sediment contains salt).
79 Sanders v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 204 Fed. 2d 436 (C. A. 3, 1953).
80 Charles v. Texas Co., 199 S. C. 156, 18 S. E. 2d 382 (1942).
81 Pass v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 242 Fed. 2d 914 (C. A., Ga., 1957).
82 Orthopedic Co. v. Eutsler, 276 Fed. 2d 455 (C. A., Va., 1960).
83 125 Fla. 189, 169 S. 660 (1936).
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escape from their well and flow into the stream;8 4 experiments
with naphthalene causing explosion; 5 tests as to mercury con-
tent per cubic meter of air in a mill;80 and tests concerning the
pressure entering a gas heater in a wrongful death action. 7
Unusual Cases
In Guinan v. Famous Players-Laskey Corp.,88 Judge Crosby
stated in his opinion:
The experiments in the case at bar consisted of subjecting
pieces of film to various degrees of heat, to contact with
electric sparks after burning to ascertain its inflammable
character. Small pieces of film were pulverized, inserted in
a cartridge and fired from a revolver to determine the
explosive qualities of the film. Obviously, an exact duplica-
tion of an explosion in a streetcar would not be practicable.
We are of the opinion that the judge was warranted in ad-
mitting evidence of the methods and results of the experi-
ment to assist the jury in determining the inflammable and
explosive character of the scrapped film, a question of much
importance in the case at bar.
McComb v. C. A. Swanson & Sons,8 9 held that testimony
concerning results of a certain test, made under an employer's
direction, to determine the time required by employees in chang-
ing to and from working uniforms was competent but was not
conclusive. The tests were generally made in a room with only
two employees or at most a very few persons present, whereas
actual daily changes were generally, though not always made,
with many fellow workers present.
The leisure class became the subject of an experiment in
Blue v. St. Clair Country Club"° which involved the testimony of
a mechanical engineer, based on calculations using principles and
tables of aerodynamics, that wind of a specified velocity, exerting
its maximum force upon a beach umbrella of specified size would
84 Chaplin Refining Co. v. Smith, 190 Okla. 287, 123 P. 253 (1942).
85 Flahertys Case, 316 Mass. 719, 56 N. E. 880 (1944).
86 Pershing Quicksilver Co. v. Theirs, 62 Nev. 382, 152 P. 2d 432 (1944).
87 Cervantes v. Maco Gas Co., 177 Cal. App. 2d 246; 2 Cal. Rep. 75 (1960).
88 267 Mass. 501, 167 N. E. 235 (1929); Commonwealth v. Best, 180 Mass.
492, 62 N. E. 748 (1901); Commonwealth v. Buxton, 205 Mass. 49, 91 N. E. 128
(1910).
89 77 Fed. Supp. 716 (D. C. Nebr., 1948).
90 10 Ill. App. 2d 151, 134 N. E. 2d 540 (1956).
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lift a specified number of pounds. It was held that this was not
testimony concerning the results of experiments requiring the
showing that all essential conditions of the experiment were
identical with those existing at the time of the occurrence, which
would give rise to an action.
A mother's action was brought against a sheriff's sureties,
for the death of her son who suffocated while imprisoned in a
county jail, as the result of a burning mattress, in Baker v.
Walston."' There was testimony that two men from inside of a
cell, using buckets and running water which were in the cell on
the night when the prisoner lost his life, extinguished a mattress
set on fire outside of his cell, similar to the one which was
burned on the night when the prisoner was suffocated. This was
admissible, and the fact that the experiment was not made under
the exact circumstances that existed on the fatal night went to
the credibility of the testimony rather than to its admissibility.
Harper v. Blasi,92 was an action for damages for injuries al-
leged to have been inflicted in a personal assault. An experi-
ment as to the effect of a blow to the eye was held to be not ad-
missible.
Other decisions concerned experiments in pouring salt water
upon two small plants in order to determine the effect of salt
water on the plants; 93 an experiment with the effect of fire upon
furs; 94 tests made on underground basements for wells in an
action to enjoin a defendant from interfering with the flow of a
river; 95 and an analysis of soil by a chemist in an action against
an oil company for pollution of a stream.96
Harper v. Holcomb, 97 was an action for injuries to the plain-
tiff caused by the defendant shooting him because of mistaking
him for a deer. Evidence of experiments made after the oc-
currence showed that the defendant might readily have dis-
tinguished the plaintiff from a deer, had he exercised reasonable
care. This was competent on proof that the conditions were so
similar to those existing at the time and place of injury as to
render the results of the experiments of substantial value.
91 121 S. W. 2d 409 (Tex. Civ. App., 1940).
92 112 Colo. 518, 151 P. 2d 716 (1944).
93 Ruth Fuel Co. v. Nichter, 174 Okla. 601, 51 P. 2d 502 (1935).
94 Snowiss v. Firemens Insurance Co. of Newark, N. J., 322 Pa. 161, 185 A.
260 (1936).
95 Rancho Santa Margarita v. Bail, 11 Cal. 2d 501, 81 P. 2d 533 (1938).
96 Skelly Oil Co. v. Jordan, 186 Okla. 130, 96 P. 2d 524 (1940).
97 146 Wisc. 183, 130 N. W. 1128 (1911).
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Results of experiments that have been held to be admissible
include evidence of a watch-ticking test made by an attending
physician in order to determine the hearing of the plaintiff; 98
tests concerning the spontaneous ignition of oil stains; 99 experi-
ments in an action against the defendant for negligently fur-
nishing unfit ether and against two physicians for negligently ad-
ministering the ether; 100 an experiment in loading hogs on a
wagon; 101 tests concerning the inflammability of substances im-
mediately adjacent to a heated stovepipe; 102 tests with different
water supply faucets for the purpose of showing that the quantity
of water shown by a water meter could not have flowed
through; 103 tests and observations of a lay witness concerning
a Babcock test requiring no particular knowledge in chemis-
try; 104 an experiment indicating that broken pipe would not
rust where gas escaped; 105 tests as to the tensile strength of
fabric yarn; 106 and tests indicating that a telephone pole could
not roll without human intervention. 10 7
Experiments which were held to be inadmissible included
testing of the strength of a fire hose; 108 an experiment tending
to show the amount of pressure brought upon a steam pipe which
burst; 109 tests to show the qualities of cement; 110 and testimony
of physician concerning flinching as an expression indicating
suffering.111
9s Wilson v. Chicago City Railway Co., 144 Ill. App. 604 (1908).
99 Thornhill v. Carpenter-Morton Co., 220 Mass. 593, 108 N. E. 474 (1915).
100 Moehlenvrock v. Parke-Davis & Co., 141 Minn. 154, 169 N. W. 541 (1918).
101 Kohlhagen v. Cardwell, 93 Ore. 610, 184 P. 261, 8 A. L. R. 11 (1919).
102 Adams v. Wilkes, 118 S. C. 93, 109 S. E. 804 (1921).
103 Eastport Water Co. v. E. A. Holmes Packing Co., 121 Me. 345, 117 A. 311
(1922).
104 Graustein v. Wyman, 250 Mass. 290, 145 N. E. 450 (1924).
105 James v. Bailey Reynolds Chandelier Co., 325 Mo. 1051, 30 S. W. 2d 118
(1930).
106 Tebernill v. Southern Brighton Mills, 49 Ga. App. 390, 175 S. E. 665
(1934).
107 McPheters v. Loomis, 125 Conn. 526, 7 A. 2d 437 (1939).
108 City of Chicago v. Greer, 76 U. S. 726, 19 L. Ed. 769 (1869).
109 Mitchell v. Sayles, 28 R. I. 240, 66 A. 547 (1907).
110 Burke v. Garden City Sand Co., 141 Ill. App. 603, affd. 237 Ill. 473, 86
N. E. 1055 (1908).
111 Norris v. Detroit United Railway, 185 Mich. 264, 151 N. W. 747 (1915).
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Ohio's Attitude Towards Experimental Evidence
Generally, in Ohio, in order to render experiments made out
of court admissible, the conditions need not be identical to those
existing at the time of the occurrence in question. It is sufficient
if there is substantial similarity. 112
Similarity of conditions will amount to a demonstration and
be conclusive upon the issues involved in the case. Dissimilarity
will, of course, affect the weight of the evidence, and in some in-
stances, affect its admissibility.
Ohio Jurisprudence on Evidence states:
According to the general rule, evidence of experiments made
out of the court and not in the presence of the jury is ad-
missible upon the same principle that admits experiments
conducted in the jury's presence. 113
An early case in the state of Ohio was Smith v. State.1 1 4 This
was a criminal action in which it was attempted to establish by
experiments that the state's star witness could not have recog-
nized the defendant as the person committing the crime of ma-
licious shooting as seen through a tavern window, in the light
emitted by the discharge of a gun. The defendant offered to
prove that, since the filing of the indictment, the witnesses had,
at another place, tried experiments of looking through a glass
window at a person at various distances varying from 2 to 15 feet.
A candle was burning in the room in such a position as to re-
flect its light through the window and toward the place where
the person on the outside of the window stood. While the wit-
ness was so looking through the window, the person outside fired
a pistol directed towards the witness looking out through the
window. The witness, though he could see the person outside
the window, could not distinguish and identify him. The light
from the flash of the pistol did not enable the witness to dis-
tinguish the person being looked at. Nor did the light from the
firing of the pistol aid his vision or enable him to see the person
any more clearly or distinctly. Judge Thurman of the Supreme
Court of Ohio said that rejection of this experimental evidence
was error. Judge Thurman went on to comment on the use of
the expert witness as compared with the ordinary man and said:
112 State v. Ferrel, 64 Ohio L. Abs. 481 (1953).
113 21 Ohio Jur. 2d, Evidence, Sec. 524, at 548.
114 2 Ohio St. 512 (1853).
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It requires no scientific witness to tell a jury whether he
saw the eyes and nose and the white of the teeth of the man
who shot at him, by the flash of the pistol that he fired. And
proof that a number of men, of ordinary powers of vision,
have tried the experiment, and found themselves unable
thus to distinguish countenances-found that their vision
was not thereby aided at all-is evidence entitled to as much,
if not more, weight, than opinions of scientific men...115
Perhaps the first civil case in Ohio involving the admissi-
bility of experiments was Schweinfurth v. The C. C. C. & St. L.
Railway Co.116 This was an action for wrongful death caused
by the decedent being struck by a passenger train operated by
the defendant while he was driving on Greenwood Street, in the
city of Marion, where it crosses the defendant's road. The al-
leged wrongful acts of the defendant which resulted in decedent's
death consisted of running its passenger train at the street cross-
ing at a reckless and dangerous rate of speed, downgrade and
beyond control, at a speed of more than 35 mph, without signals
nor any ringing bells or lookout ahead.
The defendant railway company was permitted, at its re-
quest, with the consent of the plaintiff and in pursuance of an
order of court procured by it, to make experiments in the pres-
ence of the jury (outside the courtroom), of the running of a
train over the crossing where the plaintiff intestate was killed,
under conditions practically the same as those which existed
when the accident occurred. The court held in the fifth para-
graph of its syllabus,
. . . the information of the jury as to the nature and cause
of the accident, the information so obtained was competent
evidence for consideration of the jury and the instruction
to that effect was not erroneous.
Judge Williams in the Schweinfurth case, 17 stated:
Experiments made in the presence of the jury . . . are, in a
measure, a substitute for oral testimony, and often may af-
ford evidence more satisfactory and reliable.
Not long after the Schweinfurth case, the Lorain Circuit
Court, on October 22, 1898, decided the case of Cleveland, Cin-
cinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Co v. Hudson.11s The
115 Ibid., at 513.
116 60 Ohio St. 215, 54 N. E. 89 (1899).
117 Ibid., at 216.
118 22 Ohio Cir. Ct. 586, 12 Ohio Cir. Dec. 661, afd. 60 Ohio St. 631, 54 N. E.
1107 (1898).
Sept., 1962
26https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol11/iss3/8
EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
plaintiff, Hudson, was injured on one of the defendant's cars. The
defendant railroad company, near Wellington, Ohio, took up a
number of rails from the track and was in the process of placing
a new rail. A signal was placed about a mile and one-third west
of the point where the rails were removed. Train No. 96 was
approaching from the west on a misty and moist day. The tracks
over which the train rode were moist. As the train approached
the place where the track had been removed, a man signalled to
stop the train. The signal from the man caused the engineer to
apply brakes to the three cars next to the engine and tender, and
the engineer, in addition, blew a whistle for the brakes on the
other cars to be applied. The train was made up of approximately
52 cars. When the signal to stop was given and the whistle blew,
the brakes were set and the engineer applied sand to the track
and reversed his engine, and set his air brakes. But the train
failed to stop before the place was reached where the track was
taken up. The engine went over the track beyond and the cars
were "piled up." Hudson, the brakeman, upon seeing the cars in
front of him going to pieces, "leaped from the car and received
very serious injuries."
The defendant railway company claimed that the plaintiff
was not in his proper position when the signal was given to shut
down the brakes. This time lost prevented the train from being
stopped, or at least slowed down, so that the plaintiff could have
gotten off the train without injury. The plaintiff, however, con-
tended that because of the negligence of a fellow brakeman, the
train did not stop within the prescribed time, nor allow him to
remove himself with safety. The railway company undertook
to establish a facsimile situation with the same number of cars,
by starting a train and undertaking to stop it in a particular time
at a particular place.
Judge Caldwell, in his decision in the Hudson case, 119 held
that when the accident occurred, the track was wet and slippery
and the men were not anticipating the necessity for stopping.
In the experiment, however, the track was not in the same con-
dition and the crew anticipated the duties to be performed.
As pointed out before, Judge Caldwell was the first Ohio
judge to recognize the very important factor of the mental
attitude of witnesses anticipating that about which they were to
testify.
119 Ibid., at 588.
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In Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company v. Fouts,120 the
plaintiff, Fouts, was a conductor, and Barnes was an engineer of
the company's east bound freight train on the 3d day of
October, 1908. Fouts got up on the deck of the last car at the
rear end and gave the backup signal and put himself in position
for backward motion. The engineer could see only the upper
part of the signal and took it for a "go ahead" signal and moved
the train forward, which threw the conductor backward off the
car. Both bones of his right leg were broken and he had to have
the leg amputated below the knee. He sued the company for
damages, alleging that the engineer negligently interpreted his
back-up motion for the go ahead signal. The affirmative defense
was that Fouts violated a rule of the company by giving the sig-
nal where he could not see the engineer. In the lower court, the
jury awarded damages to the plaintiff. A motion for a new
trial was overruled and judgment entered on the verdict. The
Circuit Court affirmed the judgment and error was assigned
to the Supreme Court of Ohio.
The plaintiff attempted to reproduce in the courtroom the
signal which he gave to the engineer, Barnes, against the bright
sky, five to six hundred feet away. The lower court had admitted
the demonstration of the signal before the jury. The Supreme
Court held that this was error, and Judge Wilkin in his opinion
stated:
: * . that concrete evidence of the signal was given to the
jury by ocular demonstration in the courtroom, and that this
exhibition of the real thing is more reliable than word pic-
tures of it. This objection is unattainable and it points out
the very source of the error of the lower courts. It was a
mistake to let the plaintiff attempt to reproduce in view of
the jury in the courtroom the signal which he thought he
gave. The controversy was not about how he made the signal,
but how it appeared to the engineer in the situation in the
open country as seen against a bright afternoon sky at five to
six hundred feet distant when only the head and hand of the
conductor was visible. What the jury saw, close at hand, in-
doors under a subdued light, was a distinctly different thing
than that which was presented to Barnes . . .121
Toledo Terminal Railroad Company v. Mauk 122 is another
example of counsel for the railroad company, as in the Fout case,
120 88 Ohio St. 305, 104 N. E. 544, 1915A Ann. Cas. 1256.
121 Ibid., at 307.
122 9 Ohio App. 438 (1918).
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failing to establish similarity of conditions in order to properly lay
the foundation for the introduction of an experiment conducted
outside the court.
The plaintiffs in Breymann v. the Pennsylvania, Ohio &
Detroit Railway Co., 12 3 sought to recover damages for the destruc-
tion by fire, on the 8th day of June, 1926, of four dredges and
three tugboats. The dredges and tugboats were moored on a
river property which was owned by the Pennsylvania, Ohio &
Detroit Co., an Ohio corporation. The plaintiffs contended that
the fire on the dredge could have been caused by cinders or
sparks emitted from a locomotive owned by the defendants.
The defendants called Gilbert A. Young, of the engineering de-
partment of Duke University, admittedly an expert on the sub-
ject, to describe and give results of experiments made by him as
to how far sparks emanated from locomotives of various types-
one of which was equipped as that of the defendant's in error-
could carry and retain sufficient heat to cause ignition of sub-
stances on which they fell.
To rebut the testimony of Young, in the Breymann case, the
plaintiff offered a Mr. McLaren, an employee of the U. S. Forestry
Division of the Department of Agriculture. To qualify him as an
expert on the subject, evidence was offered concerning experi-
ments which he had made to determine at what distances sparks
emitted from locomotives would ignite various described sub-
stances. The court erroneously refused to permit him to describe
the experiments, because the conditions were not identical to the
fact in issue.124
A good statement by a court in Ohio concerning the admis-
sibility of experimental evidence conducted outside the court-
room, depending on the substantial similarity of the conditions,
was made by the Supreme Court in the case of St. Paul Fire &
Marine Insurance Co. v. The Baltimore & Ohio Railway Co.: 12.
Evidence of experiments performed out of court, tending to
prove or disprove a contention in issue, is admissible if there
is a substantial similarity between the conditions existing
when the experiments are made, with those existing at the
time of the occurrence in dispute; dissimilarities, when not
so marked as to confuse and mislead the jury, go to the
weight rather than the admissibility of the evidence. (Case
123 43 Ohio App. 473, 183 N. E. 771 (1932).
124 Ibid., at 475.
125 129 Ohio St. 401, 195 N. E. 861 (1935).
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involved cinders passing through the spark arrestor attached
to a locomotive to the vegetation on the right of way im-
mediately adjacent to the railroad property.)
In May 1936, in Weaver v. Liberty Cabs, Inc.,120 decided by
the Second District, Ohio Court of Appeals (Montgomery
County), railroad cases involving experiments, began to give way
to the new leader of American transportation, the automobile.
The defending company in the Weaver case, 127 a negligence
action, attempted to admit into evidence testimony of a mechanic
in the employ of the company as to a general check made of the
cab involved in the accident. The mechanic was allowed to
testify, over objection of plaintiff's counsel, concerning the check,
consisting of observations of brakes, lights, horns, windshield
wipers, and the mechanical condition of the car throughout. The
witness was permitted to describe the type of lights on the
defendant's car, the kind and power of bulbs carried in the head-
lights, and that the headlights, as determined from the tests in
the shop, would throw a light in darkness ahead, a distance of
about 75 feet. Judge Hornbeck stated in his opinion:
On direct and cross-examination, it was made plain to the
jury that the evidence was submitted only as it might be
helpful as it would reflect upon the charge that the head-
lights on the defendant's car on the night of the accident did
not comply with the laws as to the distance which the beams
would be projected ahead. There was no error in admitting
the testimony with the qualifications appearing in the
record. 128
Judge Carpenter, in Bickley v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 129 had
presented to him a factual situation providing an excellent
opportunity to rule upon dissimilarities which may occur in
attempting to conduct an experiment out of court in order to
comply with the requirement of "substantial similarity." The
plaintiff (a woman) brought an action against the Sears Roebuck
Company following a fall on a slippery substance known as
"Dustdown" which was on the defendant's floor. A male em-
ployee of the Sears Roebuck Company, the day following the
126 21 Ohio L. Abs. 563, 33 N. E. 853 (1936); Streit v. Kestel, 161 N. E. 2d
409 (Ohio, 1959).
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid., at 565.
129 62 Ohio App. 180, 23 N. E. 2d 505 (1938).
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accident, conducted an experiment where he placed sweeping
compound on the floor and himself tried to slip on it. The court
rejected this evidence. 130
Taylor v. Sidwell 131 involved evidence of an expert witness,
a seismologist, concerning an experiment conducted shortly
before the trial in an action for damages to plaintiff's residence
as the result of the defendant's blasting operation. The evidence
was refused, where two years after the injuries and damages
complained of, defendant's operation had moved at least one
thousand feet west from the point and location of blasting, and
where all of the mineral products had been blasted and extracted
from all of the parts of the field occupied and operated by defend-
ants. It was no longer possible to reproduce any experiment
either at or near the original locale.
State v. Sheppard,132 aside from its news noteworthiness at
the time of trial, presented a very interesting question concern-
ing the admissibility of out of court experiments conducted in a
criminal trial. In this case, a criminologist, Dr. Kirk, called in
behalf of the defendant, Dr. Sheppard, attempted to reproduce
the skull of the victim in order to determine the characteristics
of blood splattered from impact. In this experiment, a wooden
block was taken as approximating the hardness of the skull. A
layer of sponge rubber 1/sth inch thick was placed over it, this
being about the thickness of the subcutaneous layer of the fore-
head and scalp. Then a sheet of polyethylene plastic, to simulate
the skin, was placed over the sponge rubber. The arrangement,
so prepared, was placed on a stool on wrapping paper in order
to collect blood splatter. Around the region was built a rectangu-
lar wall bearing removable paper strips in order to collect all
flying blood on the side and in front of the swing of the object
used as a weapon. The objects used as weapons included a small
peen hammer, a metal two-cell flashlight with flared rims, an
inch thick steel bar 15 inches long, a brass rod 20 inches long, etc.
Blood was puddled on top of the plastic cover and such heavy
blows were dealt that, at least with one object, the plastic sheet
and rubber sponge were cut through to the wood.
130 Ibid., at 185; and see note, Experiment Performed in the Absence of
Jury, Admissibility of Evidence Concerning, 9 Cinn. L. Rev. 514 (1935).
131 79 Ohio L. Abs. 361, 155 N. E. 2d 726 (1958); Wood v. General Electric
Co., 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N. E. 2d 8 (1953).
132 100 Ohio App. 399, 128 N. E. 2d 504, dism. for want of a debatable
question, 164 Ohio St. 428, 131 N. E. 2d 837 (1955).
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Presiding Judge Kovachy, commenting on the admissibility
of the Dr. Kirk experiment, stated:
Experiments to be admissible as evidence must be per-
formed with identical and substantially similar equipment
and under conditions closely approximating those existing
at the time of the occurrence being investigated . . . The
most important, the head of the victim, was attempted to be
simulated by a contraption, conjured up by Dr. Kirk without
any scientific correlation to the original body whatever. 133
Conclusion
Perhaps the greatest insight into what not to do (or what
to do) in conducting experiments can best be gained by a thor-
ough reading of the various decisions.
The largest number of decisions rejecting the results of
experiments were based on the lack of the element of "substantial
similarity." However, the burden of the trial lawyer has been
eased by decisions reducing the requirement of "identical
similarity" to that of "substantial similarity."
It is the duty of the trial lawyer, in preparation of his law-
suit, to conduct experiments under conditions as similar as
possible to the conditions existing at the time under inquiry.
The condition attempted to be duplicated may include
climate, time, machinery used, speed, etc., just to mention a few.
In addition to the requirement of similarity, the trial lawyer
must also consider the "mental attitude" of the lay witness or of
the expert conducting the experiment.
In the purely scientific experiment, involving the laws of
science rather than a variable human factor, the "mental attitude"
is of little consequence.
In conducting experiments where the human factor plays an
important role, the "mental attitude" of the lay witness or expert
is to be considered in framing the circumstances under which
the experiment is to be conducted. There appears to be no method
available to eradicate the human factor from the conduct of
such experiments.
As the experiments mentioned in this article often must be
conducted outside of the courtroom because of the size of the ma-
chinery involved or the space needed, it is important that the
jury be given an insight into the similarity of conditions and the
detailed work used in conducting the experiment.
13 Ibid., at 402.
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Therefore, by the use of 35 mm. color slides, 8 or 16 mm.
film, descriptive charts, and other media available for impressing
the jury by sight accompanied by the oral testimony of the lay
witness or expert, the story of the experiment may be readily
conveyed to the jury.
Modern advocacy methods, of course, are part of the trial
lawyer's practice. By the use of visual aids a more convincing
story concerning the experiment may be brought to the court-
room.
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